As Turkey shifts its foreign policy focus towards the East, it might no longer be a pushover for the West, says Saurabh Kumar Shahi
Post-Ottoman Turkey’s dealings with the Arabs was summarised by a famous adage coined in the mid-20s—Ne Sam’in sekeri, ne Arabin yüzü. It meant “neither sweets from Damascus nor an Arab’s face.” And as it happened, in the next 90 years, neither any sweet made its way from Damascus, nor did Turkey have to join ranks with Arabs in the west Asian conflict. But things are changing. And ironically, the sweets that had left a bitter taste in mouth of the Western world indeed arrived from Damascus.
This transformation is momentous as it implies the commencement of a fresh politics, particularly in West Asia. Turkey’s foreign policy community has decided for fresh terms of engagement with both its western and eastern neighbours. While much of its new policy has alleviated conflicts and expanded economic and political collaboration, it has also shaped new fields of apprehension for the West, predominantly in the weakening association with Israel, the new-fangled tactical partnership with Syria, and the friendly dealings with Iran and Sudan. This has led to an increasing number of Western analysts asking whether Turkey will break its word on its conventional Western orientation, opting as a substitute, regional leadership and associations in the Muslim world. “The strategy is shifting at breakneck pace. If the Turks, only a decade ago, were in conflicts of varied intensity — particularly with Greece, Syria, Iraq and Armenia — today, merely the Cypriot hitch remains unsettled,” says Kerem Oktem, an expert on Turkish foreign policies at the European Studies Centre in the University of Oxford, while talking to TSI. The West is particularly rattled by its dealings with Israel. For years, Turkey has kept itself aloof from the Palestine issue partly because it did not want to get into the “bog” and partly because it never really pardoned Arabs for their “treachery” against the Ottoman empire, in collusion with Freemasons. After all, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pressed some incredibly susceptible Western buttons: He has dismissed apprehensions over Iran’s civil nuclear programme, for instance, and called off a war game with Israel, holding one with Syria in its place. Turkey, Erdogan said, was merely acting, “in accordance with his people’s conscience.” His people, Erdogan assured viewers, “were rejecting Israel’s participation.” Additionally, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu maintained that Turkey cannot afford to be perceived as Israel’s martial associate at a point when there are literally no efforts being made for peace.
Still, the Turkish-Israeli association is shoddier now than it had been many years ago. Ankara remains annoyed that IDF invaded Gaza—just as Turkey was trying to arbitrate indirect peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. Apparently, a few days before the attack, the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told Erdogan that no offensive was intended. Following that, in his visit to Tehran last September, Erdogan positioned himself overtly on Iran’s part, defending its nuclear programme and maintaining his view on Israel being the key source of conflict in the area.
Post-Ottoman Turkey’s dealings with the Arabs was summarised by a famous adage coined in the mid-20s—Ne Sam’in sekeri, ne Arabin yüzü. It meant “neither sweets from Damascus nor an Arab’s face.” And as it happened, in the next 90 years, neither any sweet made its way from Damascus, nor did Turkey have to join ranks with Arabs in the west Asian conflict. But things are changing. And ironically, the sweets that had left a bitter taste in mouth of the Western world indeed arrived from Damascus.
This transformation is momentous as it implies the commencement of a fresh politics, particularly in West Asia. Turkey’s foreign policy community has decided for fresh terms of engagement with both its western and eastern neighbours. While much of its new policy has alleviated conflicts and expanded economic and political collaboration, it has also shaped new fields of apprehension for the West, predominantly in the weakening association with Israel, the new-fangled tactical partnership with Syria, and the friendly dealings with Iran and Sudan. This has led to an increasing number of Western analysts asking whether Turkey will break its word on its conventional Western orientation, opting as a substitute, regional leadership and associations in the Muslim world. “The strategy is shifting at breakneck pace. If the Turks, only a decade ago, were in conflicts of varied intensity — particularly with Greece, Syria, Iraq and Armenia — today, merely the Cypriot hitch remains unsettled,” says Kerem Oktem, an expert on Turkish foreign policies at the European Studies Centre in the University of Oxford, while talking to TSI. The West is particularly rattled by its dealings with Israel. For years, Turkey has kept itself aloof from the Palestine issue partly because it did not want to get into the “bog” and partly because it never really pardoned Arabs for their “treachery” against the Ottoman empire, in collusion with Freemasons. After all, Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan has pressed some incredibly susceptible Western buttons: He has dismissed apprehensions over Iran’s civil nuclear programme, for instance, and called off a war game with Israel, holding one with Syria in its place. Turkey, Erdogan said, was merely acting, “in accordance with his people’s conscience.” His people, Erdogan assured viewers, “were rejecting Israel’s participation.” Additionally, Turkish foreign minister Ahmet Davutoglu maintained that Turkey cannot afford to be perceived as Israel’s martial associate at a point when there are literally no efforts being made for peace.
Still, the Turkish-Israeli association is shoddier now than it had been many years ago. Ankara remains annoyed that IDF invaded Gaza—just as Turkey was trying to arbitrate indirect peace negotiations between Israel and Syria. Apparently, a few days before the attack, the then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert told Erdogan that no offensive was intended. Following that, in his visit to Tehran last September, Erdogan positioned himself overtly on Iran’s part, defending its nuclear programme and maintaining his view on Israel being the key source of conflict in the area.
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